In 2019, a confidential source – an influential Taliban commander from the Peshawar Shura with ties to Al Qaeda – was discreetly brought to Kabul for periodic debriefing sessions. During one of these sessions, an analyst asked him why Al Qaeda had managed to survive for so long. The senior Taliban commander responded, “Jihad(ism) is not like communism that collapsed under pressure.” He then recited two verses from the Qur’an, Surah al-A’la (87:16-17): “But you prefer the worldly life, while the Hereafter is better and more enduring.” He elaborated that Al Qaeda does not make any promise to materially change peoples’ lives but instead prioritizes the Hereafter over the worldly life. The group fighters are not motivated by material gain — they fight for Akhirah (the Hereafter). According to him, Al Qaeda indoctrinates its members with the belief that this worldly life, with all its hardships, is a temporary test, and that patience is essential for achieving victory and success in both this life and the eternal one.
While such reasoning may not resonate with many around the world—who might find it difficult to dedicate their lives to a path of violence and destruction—this rhetoric has been one of Al Qaeda’s most effective tools. It helped the group not only survive the post-9/11 Global War on Terror but also expand its networks, territorial presence, and support base. Al Qaeda’s ideological narrative even enabled the group to pioneer some innovations in violence, such as establishing suicide units with advanced knowledge of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which were used to target the group’s enemies – including civilians – in dozens of countries. The group extended this ideology to its many affiliates and associates, as well as to thousands of inspired individuals globally, encouraging them to adopt the same rhetorical framework in pursuit of Akhirah (the Hereafter). The call for a better afterlife has deeply resonated with youth in various societies, particularly where individuals are searching for meaning in their existence or grappling with hardships such as poverty, hopelessness, and other forms of deprivation fueled by conflict and atrocities around the world. Such attraction of the afterlife provided Al Qaeda with the opportunity to expand by exploiting these grievances.
In addition, Al Qaeda’s leadership has employed a deliberate strategy to maintain ideological coherence across its global network. This coherence has significantly empowered the organization to continue its mission and propagate its vision of “endless and continuous jihad.” The concept of perpetual jihad removed any perceived need for a concrete timetable for victory, fostering a sense of strategic patience among its fighters – a mindset that was then instilled across its various branches.
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Localization: Process of Assimilation
In September 2019,during a joint Afghan-U.S. operation, Asim Omar – the Emir of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) – and Abu Raihan, his courier to Ayman al-Zawahiri – the second Emir of Al Qaeda after Osama bin Laden – were killed, and about a dozen others were arrested. Among those detained was an AQIS propaganda team, trained by Al Qaeda in Karachi, Pakistan. This team – comprising both men and women – was tasked with conducting social media-based propaganda campaigns designed to instill and sustain a sense of strategic patience among Taliban fighters. Their mission was to mitigate the psychological impact of the ongoing Doha negotiations with the U.S. The same team was also responsible for transferring their technical expertise to Taliban elements in Helmand and neighboring provinces.Undoubtedly, this was not the only Al Qaeda team supporting the Taliban in such efforts.
In April 2020, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) -Afghanistan’s national intelligence agency under the Republic – uncovered five additional teams trained and supported by Al Qaeda operating in various provinces, including Paktika, Ghazni, Kunduz, Faryab, and Kunar. This collaboration intensified after the Taliban’s takeover ofAfghanistanin August 2021. Numerous Al Qaeda technical teams, trained in the Middle East, arrived in multiple Afghan provinces to run social media campaigns on behalf of the Taliban and to provide training to selected Taliban members who had passed a tough security clearance process. Some confidential reports fromAfghanistaneven indicate that Al Qaeda teams take advantage of computerized automated programs known as bots as part of their operations. While the use of such bots is limited inAfghanistan, the group employs the same programs in other parts of the world as well.
Notably, the Taliban leadership officially denied Asim Omar’s death in the Helmand operation – similar to their response following the U.S. strike onAyman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in July 2022. Al Qaeda together with the Taliban even took steps to sow doubt among regional intelligence services. In one instance, a Taliban commander in Helmand sent a message via a courier to one of Omar’s family members in India, claiming that he was still alive. As a result, the family refrained from holding a funeral ceremony. This deception prompted some intelligence agencies to question whether to accept reports of Omar’s death and remove him from their watchlists. However, the NDS formally announced Omar’s death in October 2019, nearly two weeks after the operation. This confirmation followed official procedures, including forensic verification. This case illustrates how Al Qaeda and its affiliates manipulate perceptions to force intelligence agencies to waste resources confirming what is already confirmed. Given the limited nature of intelligence resources, such distractions can result in opportunity costs – forcing agencies to divert attention from other higher-priority threats.
Decentralization: A “Network of Networks”
Another calculated step, implemented with the support of Ayman al-Zawahiri was the transformation of the group from a centralized hierarchical structure into a decentralized “network of networks.” This strategic shift allowed the group to diversify its recruitment base.Once dominated by a small circle of Arabs from the Middle East, Al Qaeda evolved into a broader network comprising thousands of individuals either directly recruited or inspired by its ideology and narratives.Abu Musab al-Suri, one of Al Qaeda’s key ideologues, envisioned this decentralized model and is often referred to as the architect of the new Al Qaeda. This move significantly amplified the group’s global messaging and influence. Simultaneously, it increased the number of individuals appearing on intelligence watchlists worldwide. More people to monitor meant greater demand on intelligence resources, further complicating the already complex landscape of the Global War on Terror. The approach significantly contributed to developing and maintaining resilience amongAl Qaeda members and fighters. Obviously, the group’s growth despite intensified global counterterrorism efforts underscores the effectiveness of this strategy in enhancing Al Qaeda’s transformation.
The decentralization approach laid the foundation for another strategic shift within Al Qaeda. Ayman al-Zawahiri led a process to facilitate the embedding of Al Qaeda leadership and military cadres within local affiliates and associates. This helped Al Qaeda to lay low and submerge within other local terrorist groups. For instance, in October 2020, Husam Abd-al-Ra’uf, also known asAbu Muhsin al-Masri, one of Al Qaeda’s top leaders, was killed in Ghazni province ofAfghanistanduring an operation conducted by the NDS. During the operation, two of his Afghan aides were also arrested. The NDS later learned that both aides had dual allegiance to both Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Recent reports fromAfghanistansuggest that dual allegiance has increased among the Taliban and become a normal phenomenon within terrorist groups in South and Central Asia. One of the aides was responsible for providing protection and security to al-Masri with the support of the Taliban. Based on materials confiscated during the operation, al-Masri was responsible for providing financial support and technical expertise to several Taliban and HQN groups in Ghazni and surrounding provinces. One of his responsibilities was to bring cohesion between the Quetta Shura and HQN activities. The second aide, known as Zahid, was released after a few months, as his name was on the Taliban list of 5,000 to be freed based on the US-Taliban so-called Doha peace deal.
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Maintaining Authority: A Risky but Effective Approach
In 2018, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) arrestedAbdullah Mansouraka Ansari aka Masoum – the second-in-command of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) – during an intelligence operation designed to capture him as he traveled from Pakistan toAfghanistan. Following his arrest,Abu Zar al-Burmi, who was responsible for managing Al Qaeda’s relationships with various groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the TIP, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other regional terrorist organizations, contacted the NDS through an intermediary. He appeared to offer his collaboration, but his actual objective was to secure Ansari’s release. To convince the NDS of his identity and sincerity, Abu Zar traveled from Karachi, Pakistan, toAfghanistanand participated in several debriefing sessions. Once the NDS uncovered his true motives, the key question arose: why would he take such a significant risk for Ansari? The answer was twofold. First, he had been instructed by Al Qaeda’s leadership to do so – employing deception to facilitate the release of his “Mujahid brother.” Second, Al Qaeda needed to assert its authority and leadership over affiliated networks. Al Qaeda regards groups such as the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, the Turkistan Islamic Party, and other terrorist organizations in Central and South Asia as extensions of its military arm. Therefore, it views the protection and empowerment of these groups – even at great personal and operational risk – as essential to preserving the respect and authority it commands within its vast global network.
Conclusion
Al Qaeda’s survival is not accidental – it is the result of a deliberate fusion of ideology, strategy, and deception. By rejecting conventional milestones and embedding itself within broader militant ecosystems, the group has adapted to global pressure while remaining committed to its core vision: “endless jihad” in pursuit of the Hereafter. As long as this ideology endures – fuelled by belief, sustained through alliances, and cloaked in misdirection – Al Qaeda will remain a persistent and underestimated threat, not just to national security, but to the understanding of what truly sustains modern terrorism.
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