By: David Scott Mathieson
Just three weeks after the devastating earthquake that rocked Central Myanmar, a similarly seismic event has impacted the complex civil war between multiple rebel organizations and the junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), raising serious questions about whether it is intervening after four years of war to ensure the junta’s survival.
In recent days, after weeks of speculation, the major city of Lashio, population 130,000 in Northern Shan State, 890 km north of the capital city Yangon, has been handed back to the Myanmar military after it was captured by rebels, the ethnic Kokang insurgents, last August. Brokered by China in late March after talks between the SAC and the forces of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a convoy of Chinese officials in vehicles with decals that said, in Chinese and Myanmar languages, ‘Ceasefire Monitoring Group,’ entered Lashio on April 20.
The Chinese Special Envoy for Asian Affairs, Deng Xijun, in effect Beijing’s point person for Myanmar, arrived in the city to broker the talks. Just two days later, a major convoy of Myanmar military troops entered the city, as MNDAA forces repositioned under pressure from Beijing to areas outside.
In the regular press briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 21, spokesperson Guo Jiakun replied to a question on the Lashio issue by saying: “China and Myanmar are friendly neighbors. China’s position on the Myanmar issue is very clear. We follow the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, support Myanmar in safeguarding independence, sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity, support various parties in Myanmar in carrying out friendly consultation toward political reconciliation, and support Myanmar in resuming the political transition process.”
Myanmar media also reported that the SAC Defense Minister, General Maung Maung Aye, in a press briefing in the Myanmar military-held city of Pyin U Lwin on Wednesday, said that the military and the Kokang group had agreed to a peace deal and would be cooperating in the future. This suggests a whole new interpretation of the term ‘mixed administration,’ if the SAC, MNDAA, and potentially other groups will divide administrative and security functions inside Lashio and its surrounding areas in what will likely be an uneasy ‘peace.’
How will a multitude of forces traverse territory without sparking clashes? Making things even more confounding is the role of the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA), which also has troops in the city, but professes to be neutral in the conflict.
What does this augur for conflict dynamics in Northern Shan State? The first consideration is how relations between the MNDAA and its allies in the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BA) are affected, the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army, but also a plethora of smaller People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and other anti-SAC insurgents. Since launching Operation 1027 in October 2023, and its second phase in June of 2024, the 3BA seized several key towns along the main highway from the China border to Mandalay, including the North East Regional Military Command in Lashio. How vulnerable does the TNLA now feel? Is there a sense of betrayal between members of the 3BA and the broader network of anti-SAC resistance?
The Myanmar military column had to drive into the city from the south, as various 3BA forces, mostly the MNDAA and TNLA, control the highway from Nawnghkio to Lashio, and from Hsenwi and Kutkai in the north to the Chinese border. Any military campaign to retake these towns would likely be heavily contested. When the SAC loses territory, it invariably pummels urban areas with air strikes, as it did in the months following the fall of Lashio, targeting the central market and a number of hotels.
The civilian population has been badly affected already by the conflict. Does the deal suggest more or less fighting? As a result of the handover, will China resume full border trade, when it has squeezed transport of goods and medicines for several months in order to pressure the MNDAA to make concessions? All of these details seem still to be worked out.
There is another element of uncertainty, and that is internal group cohesion after such a prize is relinquished. It isn’t known how many Kokang soldiers and their allies were lost not just in the battle for Lashio, but also in two phases of Operation 1027, but the likely number would be in the thousands. Footage of highly orchestrated funerals in MNDAA territory shows rows of hundreds of Chinese tombs, and this is just for public consumption. What will the rank and file, and the families of the fallen, think of this surrender of Lashio to the regime?
And adding to the mire of uncertainty is China’s role as a ceasefire broker. The arrival of a Chinese envoy and ceasefire monitors renders ridiculous Guo Jiakun’s claims that China stays out of its neighbors’ internal affairs. Myanmar’s perceptions of China experienced a positive boost following generous earthquake aid, with pledges of a billion yuan (US$137 million), and the dispatch of search and rescue and medical teams. But animosity towards Chinese meddling in Myanmar always percolates close to the surface, and could spill over following the Lashio deal.
Whether China’s interventions suggest that Beijing has invested in the SAC’s survival or that it will continue to manage competing armed groups to establish a modus vivendi in lieu of any longer-term conflict resolution is, as always, not so straightforward in Myanmar. As the surprising decision over Lashio illustrates, China’s role remains mercurial and unpredictable.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, human rights, and humanitarian issues in Myanmar
